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1. INTRODUCTION
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is now a well-
established discipline with growing applications in support
of rational decision-making involving important techno-
logical and societal risks. Risk analysis provides a common
platform for technical exchanges on safety matters between
key stakeholders, such as regulators, industry managers,
and system designers and operators. By doing a PRA we
seek to 
• Determine potential undesirable consequences asso-
ciated with use of systems and processes
• Identify ways that such consequences could materialize
• Estimate the likelihood (e.g., probability) of such
events
• Provide input to decision makers on optimal strategies
to reduce the levels of risk
In many important applications, however, risk analysis
requires a significant investment of resources to be accom-
plished effectively. In the ideal case, this investment will
result in the potential to reduce costs by removing safeguards,
redundant equipment, reducing maintenance or inspection
requirements, or streamlining operational procedures.
Conversely, it provides insight into the scenarios that
transpire during a risk event, allowing for identification
of areas were additional response capacity is required in
order to improve the risk response or other mitigating
actions.
After more than 4 decades of methodological devel-
opments and many real application applications a fair
question is whether PRA delivered on its promise. How
do we gage PRA performance? Are our expectations about
value of PRA realistic? Are there disparities between
what we get from PRA and what we had expected? Do
current PRAs reflect the knowledge gained from actual
events? How do we address potential gaps? These are
some of the questions that have been raised over the years
since the inception of the field more than forty years ago. 
This paper offers a brief assessment of PRA as a
technical discipline in theory and practice, explores its
key strengths and weaknesses, and offers suggestions on
ways to address real and perceived shortcomings.
2. PRA DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATIONS 
2.1 A Brief History
The genesis of modern PRA methodology was the
Reactor Safety Study (RSS), also known as WASH-1400
[1]. The main objective of the study was to produce a
“generic estimate” of the risks associated with commercial
nuclear power in the U.S. WASH-1400 was the first
comprehensive, large-scale probabilistic risk assessment
of a complex system. It established the core techniques
widely used for PRA of engineered systems. Following
the publication of RSS, and during the period 1980-1988,
numerous full scope PRAs of commercial nuclear power
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plants were performed by the nuclear industry. Major
milestones in applications and methodological advancements
in PRA included the nuclear industry sponsored Zion and
Indian Point-2 and -3 plant–specific PRAs completed
in1981 [2.3] where among other findings showed that
external events (earthquakes and fires) could be significant
contributors to risk of plants, and that the containment
failure did not always follow a severe core damage event. 
Another important milestone was the completion of
NRC-sponsored NUREG-1150 study in 1989. The study
took a closer look at severe accidents and containment
performance. This was followed by the Individual Plant
Examinations (IPEs) conducted by the utility companies
in response to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) generic letter [GL 88-20] in 1988 requesting that
each licensee in the United States use PRA-like method-
ologies to perform a plant-specific search for vulnerabilities
that might lead to severe accidents. These studies were
conducted in the period 1990-2000. 
The 90’s also witnessed growing interest in the PRA
technology internationally, and the efforts by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to promote and support
of the use of PRA by Member States. In 1995 the US
NRC issued the PRA policy statement that directed the
NRC staff to use PRA in all regulatory matters to the
extent supported by the state of the art, while keeping the
defense-in-depth philosophy as the cornerstone of reactor
safety and NRC regulatory and oversight function. NRC
Regulatory Guide 1.174, issued in 1998, took an important
step forward articulating how to use PRA in decisions
regarding licensee requests for change in the licensing basis.
2.2 Evolution of PRA Methodology 
The framework introduced by WASH-1400 was a
simple but powerful mix of deductive and inductive logic
model (event tree models with supporting fault trees) and
included a defined a level of decomposition (e.g., system
failure models based on functional failure modes of major
components (such as valves, pumps, and batteries), a set
of statistical approaches to estimate model parameters
(e.g., failure rates) using “generic data” and expert opinion,
and an approach to model integration (combining FT and
ET logic models) to obtain total risk and intermediate metrics
(e.g., core melt frequency) and contributing factors. 
The study however left important methodological gaps
in a number of areas including 
• Formalized inference framework 
• Explicit treatment of various dependencies 
• Dynamics (including aging effects)
• External events
• Explicit modeling of phenomenological events 
• Human and organizational factors
• Software behavior modeling 
• Explicit treatment of different types and sources of
uncertainty
Over the past 40 years since the publication of WASH-
1400, methodological advancements driven by research
and applications sponsored by government agencies and
industry, have addressed a number of these gaps. Progress
has been made by: 
• Broader coverage of risk contributors 
– External Events (Fire, Seismic, Energetic Objects, etc.) 
– Human Reliability Analysis 
– Organizational Factors/Management /Safety Culture 
• Better treatment of some dependencies
– Component-Level CCFs
– State of Knowledge Dependencies
– Multi-unit Dependencies
• Improved inference methods 
– Bayesian Inference 
– Uncertain Evidence
– Expert Opinion 
• Improved uncertainty characterization and analysis
methods
– Model and Parameter
– Aleatory and Epistemic 
– Advanced Sampling Schemes
• More advanced computational algorithms
– Binary Decision Diagram
• Benchmark exercises, peer reviews, standards
• Development of databases and operating experience
reporting systems
All these improvements were formulated essentially
within the modeling framework of WASH-1400 (which we
will call Classical PRA Approach). As such, the advance-
ments have been largely constrained by the framework itself.
2.3 Areas of Application 
Risk assessments are normally performed to implicitly
or explicitly support decisions under uncertainty. Some
applications include:
• Use of quantitative risk measures produced by PRA,
in conjunction with other safety measures (e. g.,
defense-in depth) to meet safety goals
• Use of insights provided by qualitative and quantitative
models to steer design and operational aspects of
the technological system towards higher levels of
safety, in a rational and cost-effective manner
• Application of risk information to o improve oper-
ational availability and efficiency 
More targeted applications, particularly in the nuclear
power industry include 
• Significance Determination Programs and Event
Assessments
• Precursor studies
• Improving inspection and safety oversight effectiveness
• Performing design trades (for new reactor designs and
backfits)
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3. PRA PERFORMANCE IN PRACTICE
A question often asked is whether PRAs produce
credible numerical values of risk. In search for an answer
to this question, first we recognize that most cases where
the numerical credibility is of concern involve risk of rare
events in highly reliable systems. I such cases risk estimates
are unlikely to be verifiable with statistical evidence.
However, experience in two important domains of appli-
cation, namely nuclear power and space missions, provide
indications that risk values produced by high quality PRAs
can in fact be quite credible. 
In the case of nuclear power risk we have the generic
estimates of core melt frequencies produced by WASH-
1400 in the rage 5x10-5 to 5x10-4. This can be compared
with the actual global experience of 5 core meltdown events
(TMI, Chernobyl, and 3 units at Fukushima) over roughly
10,000 reactor years of operation, that is a core melt fre-
quency of 5x10-4. In fact this number is also consistent
with measures of “central tendency” of the plant-to-plant
variability distribution of the core melt frequencies produces
by plant-specific PRAs. In addition, systems studies suggest
that by applying advanced methods for fault tree modeling,
Bayesian probability estimation methods, and properly
accounting for dependencies and uncertainties, PRA logic
models produce numerical estimates for system failure
probabilities that are consistent with the historical evidence,
i.e., observed system failure probabilities. 
The same is true in another important field of appli-
cation, the assessment of risks associated with Space
Shuttle flights. Several Space Shuttle PRA studies (see
for example [4]) sponsored by NASA over the last two
decades of space shuttle program produced estimates that
were later shown to be very realistic. One estimate calculated
the probability of Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) to
be 1/90 per mission. A later full scope Space Shuttle PRA
put the number at 1/112 per mission. The actual record
was 2/134 accounting for the Challenger and Columbia
accidents over the 134 Space Shuttle flights. 
Of course both the nuclear power and NASA studies
where done essentially with WASH-1400 style (classic
PRA) methodologies, which are far more advanced and
rigorous compared to earlier attempts in both industries
with inferior and largely ad hoc methods. For instance
earlier studies prior to WASH-1400 had estimated core
melt frequencies several orders of magnitude lower than
WASH-1400 values. Similarly for the Space Shuttle program
estimates on the order or 1/100,000 per mission were
produced. The number was calculated by starting with
1/100 as reference value (historical failure probability for
typical space launch vehicles), and then reducing it by
factors of 10 as credit for “more advanced technology”,
“astronauts high levels of skill and training” and similar
factors. Such low values of course turned out to be totally
inconsistent with the observed risk level. 
Another frequent question is whether PRAs produce
new qualitative insights. PRAs have successfully identified
many vulnerabilities that were unknown, not adequately
safeguarded against in the original designs, or simply
viewed to be unimportant. For example WASH-1400
highlighted the importance of some beyond design basis
risk scenarios and scenarios of the same class as the TMI
accident before it happened in 1979. Even though the exact
sequence of events that led to the small LOCA at TMI was
not in the WASH-1400, but small LOCAs were analyzed
in the study. 
As another example, PRAs identified and quantified
plant vulnerabilities to common cause failure events (CCF).
Also through the ranking of risk contributors by probability
and consequence, PRAs have provided a consistent basis for
prioritization and implementation of many safety improve-
ments and design decisions. Benefits of PRA in the nuclear
industry included discovery of relatively significant safety
improvements that were possible through the Individual
Plant Examination initiative in the late 1980s, risk insights
that led to the station blackout rule, which served to reduce
the relatively high risk and significance of loss of off-site
power events, and improvements in managing shutdown
risk and in applying the maintenance rule.
Many insights are of course gained simply by the
exercise of performing the PRA, building the model, and
understanding the complexities of the system and its
accident scenarios, i.e., thinking about “what can go wrong”.
When accidents occur involving system for which
PRA analysis has been conducted, a frequent question is
whether the actual accident scenario was included in the
risk analysis. Of course this a legitimate questions, but
satisfactory answer is only possible with a common
understanding of the PRA modeling paradigm, the scope
of the specific PRA in question, and the context and type
of decision the PRA was originally designed to support.
A common misconception by non-specialist is that PRAs
are supposed to include the same, somewhat arbitrary,
level of specificity and detail that we choose to view and
describe actual risk events. This of course ignores the fact
that PRA modeling is done fundamentally by abstracting
and clustering of events into classes and categories. 
The level of abstraction is a function of the decision
being supported by the PRA, state of knowledge (such as
level of understanding of the system and its human and
physical environment), and availability of resources and
suitable methods and tools. Without clustering and binning
events into classes of events, assignment of probabilities
would not be possible. Extremely detailed delineation of
event sequences in the limit essentially means zero prob-
ability of occurrence. To address this, PRA is conducted
using cluster and classes of scenarios. As these scenarios
are amassed, the summation of their individual probabilities
highlights the realistic vulnerabilities of the system under
evaluation. However, the proper identification of the
scenarios to be grouped can provide a challenge to the risk
assessment process. The identification must be complete
enough to address the vulnerabilities, but not so specific
that it creates grouping categories that are too narrow,
which results in discounting the likelihood of the accident
occurrence.
So a more meaningful question is whether the
observed risk event belongs in at least one of the event
classes included in the PRA. This of course leads to the
issue of PRA completeness, the ability of PRA to
include, within a defined scope, all possible initiators and
accident classes before applying screening on the basis of
low likelihood or insignificant consequence. 
Completeness is a major issue in the theory and appli-
cations of PRA. Attempts have been made to quantify the
degree of uncertainty in the estimated risk values due to
PRA model structure (model uncertainty) and model
parameters (parameter uncertainty)[5]. However even if
one manages to develop the most credible and accurate
quantitative assessment of model and parameter uncertainties,
the fact that “unknown-unknowns” by definition would
not be included in the risk scenario models (qualitative
completeness) is an issue. This is important from a risk
management point of view since obviously one cannot
develop and implement countermeasures against unknowns.
Needless to say that completeness is not just the breadth
of coverage by the risk scenarios, but also their depth of
causality, for instance the fidelity of definition of basic events
in fault tree and event tree models in conventional PRAs. 
4. PRA LESSONS LEARNED FROM ACCIDENTS 
One way of assessing the effectiveness of PRA method-
ologies and also identifying where and how to improve the
methods is through analyzing actual events and drawing
lessons that can be learned form them. In this section we
take a look at three accidents in two domains two where
classical PRA methods have been used. The first accident
to be discussed is a near-miss, fire-initiated, cascading
scenario at the H. B. Robinson Nuclear Power Plant located
in South Carolina. The second case is core meltdowns
experienced at Fukushima Dai-ichi, NPP site which were
the result of a strong earthquake and ensuing tsunami off
the coast of Japan. The final case is the Space Shuttle
Columbia accident in 2003 initiated by damage caused
by impact of debris at launch, resulting in the spacecraft
disintegration during re-entry at the end of the mission. 
4.1 H.B. Robinson NPP Fire Event 
On March 28, 2010, a feeder cable failure to a 4kV
non-vital bus at Robinson NPP caused an arc flash and
fire. A subsequent failure of a bus-tie breaker to open and
isolate the fault resulted in a loss of power to Reactor
Coolant Pump (RCP) B and a subsequent reactor trip.
Subsequent to the reactor trip, an automatic safety injection
(SI) actuation occurred due to an uncontrolled reactor
coolant system (RCS) cool-down. Plant response was
complicated by equipment malfunctions and failure of the
operating crew to diagnose plant conditions and properly
control the plant. During plant restoration a relay was
reset which re-initiated the electrical fault and caused a
second fire.
The event involved a number of equipment failures
including
• A feeder cable failure leads to an arc fault and initial
fire causing the failure of the Unit Auxiliary Trans-
former and non-vital Bus 5.
• Breaker 24 failed to open causing the loss of non-
vital Bus 4.
• Alternate charging valve CVC-310A opened due the
Phase-A containment isolation and air leaks within
the valve. This caused seal injection flow to be diverted
away from the RCP seals.
• The charging suction source failed to automatically
switch over from the VCT to the RWST due to
instrumentation failure.
Operator action deficiencies also contributed to the
complexity of the event:
• Failed to control the RCS cool-down caused by the
opening of the MSR drain valves.
• Failed (initially) to recognize the closure of component
cooling water (CCW) flow return valve from the RCPs.
• Failed to recognize the RCP seal injection had become
inadequate.
• Failed (initially) to diagnose the failed charging
suction switch-over resulting in a loss of charging flow.
• NLO error caused the loss of Instrument Bus 3.
• After the plant was stabilized, operators reinitiated
the electrical fault causing a second fire because they
failed to understand the current status of the electrical
system and failed to followed procedures.
Perhaps the most the most obvious and unsettling
observation from a PRA methodology point of view is that
an event of this type is unlikely to survive probability-
based screening of PRA. The large number of seemingly
independent contributors would push the scenario to
practically zero in a typical PRA. 
Additionally the event highlights some important
human performance features that are not captured by the
way HRAs are done now. These include the fact that
simulator training did not match actual plant response,
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) were deficient
in regards to verifying RCP seal injection, and command
and control within the control room was poor. During the
event crew supervisors were distracted from oversight of
the plant including the awareness of major plant parameters.
In addition, supervisors failed to properly manage the
frequency and duration of crew updates/briefs during the
early portion of the event leading to interruption in the
implementation of emergency procedures and distraction
the operators. 
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4.2 Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP Seismic/Tsunami Event
On March 11, 2011, the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant site
was hit by the combined forces of a 9.0 magnitude seismic
event and subsequent tsunami waves, more than 30 ft. in
height, that flooded the site. Of the six reactors, Units 1-3
were operating at full power at the time of the event, while
Units 4-6 were shutdown for maintenance. The units were
designed to withstand magnitude 8.2 earthquakes and the
seawall protecting the plants was design to withstand 20 ft.
tsunamis. It appears that no serious damage was done to the
reactors by the earthquake. The safety systems responded
as designed to the seismic event, reactors were shut down
automatically, and safety systems kicked in to remove the
decay heat. All six external power sources were lost due
to the earthquake, but the emergency diesel generators
located in the basements of the turbine buildings started up. 
The tsunami hit 55 minutes later. Tsunami waves
submerged and damaged the seawater pumps for the
main condenser circuits and the auxiliary cooling circuits
including the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) cooling
system. Flooding disabled 12 of 13 emergency diesel
generators, the electrical switchgear, and batteries, resulting
in station blackout. The 125-volt DC batteries for units 1 &
2 were flooded and failed, leaving them without instru-
mentation, control or lighting. Unit 3 had battery power
for about 30 hours. The reactors were isolated from their
ultimate heat sink, and all three cores largely melted in the
first three days. Fuel coolant interaction produced hydrogen
gas. Operators had to vent the hydrogen to secondary
containment building where it exploded. The hydrogen
explosion in Unit 4 escalated the severity of the event. 
Major challenge facing the operators for weeks was
restoring heat removal from the reactors and coping with
overheated spent fuel ponds, an operation that involved
hundreds of utility personnel, firefighters, and military.
The site experienced hundreds of aftershocks, including
an earthquake with magnitude 7.1, nearly a month after
the initial 9.0 shock. After three weeks Units 1-3 were
stable with water addition but no proper heat sink for
removal of decay heat. Cooling with recycled water from
new treatment plant was established in July, and reactors
reached 'cold shutdown condition' in mid-December. In
addition to complexities of providing heat removal, the
responders faced the formidable task of preventing release
of radioactive materials, particularly in contaminated water
leaked from the three units. The accident response and
evacuation were made extremely difficult due to road
damage and obstructions. Over time more than 100,000
people had to be evacuated from their homes in an evacuation
zone extended to 20 km. The accident was rated 7 on the
INES scale. 
Siu et al [6] list the set of potential PRA technology
challenges identified posed by the events at Fukushima.
These challenges involve phenomena or situations for
which current PRA technology does not appear to be s s.
They include: 
Extending the PRA Scope: Potential risk significance
of accidents triggered by regional events that could involve
multiple sites, and possibility of release of radionuclides
from multiple sources were evidenced by the Fukushima
and concurrent events at other Japanese plants. This signifies
the need to extend PRA scope to cover interdependent
multi-unit risk exposure to a common external hazard,
physical connections (e.g., unit cross-ties), the physical
impacts of the events (e.g., explosions, radioactive material
release), and accident response resource limitations. 
Treating Feedback Loops: The delay in containment
venting for Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 1 caused by incomplete
evacuation provides an indication that feedback loops
and iterations may be needed among different levels of
the PRA models, a departure form “once-through” approach
used in current NPP PRAs, progressing from a core damage
event (Level 1analysis) to containment response and
source term assessment (Level 2 analysis ) and then to
offsite consequences (Level 3 analysis). Feedback may
also be needed for example in multi-unit analyses where
progression of risk scenarios in a unit may affect the
progression of the scenarios in other units in terms of
nature, severity and temporal sequencing of the events. 
Reconsidering “Game Over” Modeling: “Game
Over” modeling in typical PRAs relies on conservative
simplifying assumptions to terminate the modeled accident
scenarios early. For instance scenarios involving complete
loss of power can be assumed to lead to core melt in a time
scale much quicker than the times reported for Fukushima
Dai-ichi Units 2 and 3. Such treatments not only miss the
opportunity to identify and assess potentially effective
accident management improvements, they also provide
skewed input to the Level 3 analysis. 
Treating Long Duration Scenarios: The tendency in
PRA practice is to assume that in long duration scenarios
(on the order of days and weeks) time is on side of safety
and stability. More detailed and realistic treatment of such
scenarios may reveal cases violating this assumption.
Examples include changes in the external environmental
conditions, such as earthquake aftershocks (at Fukushima
Dai-ichi, earthquake aftershocks and tsunami warnings
disrupted response to the initial shock and flooding), and
interruptions in the availability of physical and social
infrastructure and resources needed to cope with the
accident, particularly when essential safety functions are
provided by unconventional means. 
Improving and Expanding External Hazards
Analysis: This refers to the need for more refined external
hazards analysis, including the consideration of both
extreme hazards and concurrent failures, multiple correlated
hazards (earthquake and tsunami in the case of Fukushima);
multiple shocks (and warnings), multiple damage mech-
anisms (e.g., a tsunami analysis should, in addition to
inundation, consider other effects such as dynamic loads
from water and debris and clogging from debris) 
Improving HRA: Response events at Fukushima
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provide further evidence of the need for explicit treatment
of errors of commission (e.g., the intentional isolation of
the Isolation Condenser system at Fukushima Dai-ichi
Unit 1), different decision makers (i.e., not the typical
control room crew) who made potential errors in the
prioritization of work, and potential psychological impacts
on operators, advisers, and decision makers, recovery
action feasibility and time delays, and the effects of long
scenario duration (including fatigue, stress, and cumulative
dose). New performance influencing factors may need to
be included in HRAs to account for interruptions in response
efforts due to external factors (at Fukushima Dai-ichi,
earthquake aftershocks and tsunami warnings disrupted
site operations as operators had to take shelter and then
assemble for accountability), and the toll on operators.
Other considerations include analysis of feasibility of
operator actions performed outside the control room, in
terms of adequacy of time, accessibility of the action
location, and availability of staff with required skills. In
the Fukushima event, some actions were significantly
delayed because only contractors or other offsite personnel
knew how to perform certain actions, and also because of
environmental hazards such as seismic aftershocks, and
radiation. An additional HRA challenge is modeling
situation assessment with missing or misleading information
due to for instance instrument failures, a likely scenario
in post-core damage events. The guidance used in such
scenarios (e.g., Severe Accident Management Guidelines
– SAMGs) can call for a knowledge-based decision among
a set of difficult choices. 
4.3 Space Shuttle Columbia Accident 
On February 1, 2003, Space Shuttle Columbia disin-
tegrated during the reentry phase at the end of its mission,
resulting in loss of its crew, grounding of Shuttle flights,
and significant safety and operational impact on the Interna-
tional Space Station (ISS) among other consequences. The
accident scenario as outlined by the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board (CAIB) is as follows: 
• 81 seconds after launch, at an altitude of 65,000 feet,
Mach 2.46, bipod foam separates from the External
Tank
• Foam, 21 to 27 inches long by 12 to 18 inches wide,
weighing 1.67 pounds strikes the vehicle at relative
velocity of ~545mph
• Foam impacts Wing Leading Edge Reinforced Carbon-
Carbon (RCC), a part of the Shuttle Thermal Protection
System (TPS) near Panels 8-9, creating a hole in the
wing
• On re-entry, plasma enters the breached leading edge
of the wing near Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Panels 
• Plasma flow in left wing degrades internal structural
integrity
• Vehicle motion too great for flight control system to
manage, leads to loss of vehicle control and aerody-
namic break-up
Other aspects of the accident scenario include the
apparent decision that the observed External Tank foam
impact during Columbia ascend did not cause significant
damage based on experience from similar impacts in earlier
flights, and the decision not to pursue the possibility of
visual inspection of any potential damage.
For approximately two decades NASA sponsored a
number of full and limited scope PRAs of Space Shuttle
missions, with median probability estimates of loss of
crew and vehicle (LOCV) ranging from 1/245 to 1/78 per
flight. A number of these PRAs included a category of
accident scenarios involving damage to the TPS due to
de-boding of tiles or impact of orbital debris with a LOCV
probability of about 2E-3, according to one PRA. The
Columbia scenario in a very broad sense could be placed
in this category although clearly the exact nature of the
initiator and pursuing sequence of events are not identifiable
in the lumped scenarios. Counting the Columbia accident,
direct point estimate of the scenario probability (about
1E-2 per mission) is higher than, but not statistically
inconsistent with the PRA estimates. 
The Columbia accident has highlighted a number of
deficiencies in PRA methodology as currently practiced
for space missions. Three different categories are briefly
examined here. A longer list of issues has been discussed
elsewhere [7]. 
Columbia and other space mission accidents have
also highlighted the significance of more detailed causal
modeling. More accurate prediction of the nature (damage
mechanism) of the Columbia accident initiator would have
required a probabilistic physical model with consideration
of aleatory uncertainties in the foam size, impact load,
and RCC fragility. This would require re-tooling of the
current PRA codes that have limited or no capability for
integrating physical phenomena models. We note that
extension of basic event probability models to include
“physics of failure” may not be sufficient without adequate
consideration of possible physical and stochastic depen-
dencies of system failures due to the common underlying
phenomena. While this type of interdependency has been
recognized in modeling the impact of “external initiators”
such as seismic, fire, and flooding events in NPP PRAs
the current modeling and analysis platform imposes many
restrictions that necessitate excessive simplification in
modeling of the impact of such external events. 
The actual sequence of events in the Columbia accident
included several human decision points, rooted in cultural
and organizational factors. The CAIB report has highlighted
safety implications of a number of broadly classified
organizational factors such as “reliance on past success,”
“organizational barriers to effective communications,”
“lack of integrated management,” and “informal decision-
making processes.” Two interdependent examples are:
(1) apparent assignment of low TPS damage probability
based on past (but statistically insignificant) successes, i.e.,
negligible damage from foam and ice impacts during earlier
flight, and (2) the decision to continue normal mission
activities without exploring possible rescue options. 
These elements of the accident scenario can be easily
overlooked in PRA accident scenario models when the
decision making process, organizational factors and their
paths of influence are not explicitly included. In fact even
the methods currently proposed for incorporation of
organizational factors into PRA do not explicitly address
the potential for the direct impact of such factors on risk
scenario branch points. Rather they attempt to enhance
the causal models and probabilities of existing branch
points and corresponding basic events, i.e., component
failures and operator actions. An approach for explicit
modeling of decision points in developing risk scenarios
has been proposed.
Finally, compared with PRA estimated core melt
frequencies for the US nuclear power plants (typically in
the range 1E-5 to 1E-3 per reactor year), human space
mission failures are far more frequent by several orders of
magnitude. Estimation of such high probability risk events
can be adversely impacted by some of the approximations
routinely made in nuclear PRAs. One implication is that
the use of nuclear PRA computer codes (e.g., SAPHIRE)
that rely on probability truncations and other approximations
for large models may be inappropriate for space mission
PRA applications. We note that the technology currently
exits (PRA codes using BDD-based algorithms [8] for
cut set identification and quantification) removing the
need for such approximations. 
5. NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS WITHIN CURRENT
PRA FRAMEWORK 
The preceding discussions on strengths and limitation
of the conventional PRA methodologies as practiced for
instance in nuclear and space applications, and observations
about the three accidents reviewed above, point to a number
of methodological improvements that can significantly
enhance the quality and credibility of PRAs. In summery
we need
• Improved causal models at least for some applications
(e.g., SDP). In some cases this means additional
causal layers and introduction of more detailed
models (including “physics of failure” models and
models of organization factors) to support the
quantification of the basic event probabilities and
interdependencies. PRA is still very much hardware-
oriented, while how a plant/system is organized and
managed and the nature of its culture and safety
attitudes can be are important risk contributors that
need to be incorporated into PRA models. Equally
important are use of more explicit modeling of system
software and control failures and better integration
of such failures into the process of structuring risk
scenarios.
• Extended PRA scope to cover interdependent multi-
unit and distributed systems risk exposure to a
common external hazard, physical connections
(e.g., unit cross-ties), the physical impacts of the
events (e.g., explosions, radioactive material release),
and accident response resource availability 
• Improved and expanded external hazards analysis,
including modeling of multi-hazard situations as
well as better treatment of long duration events
• Tighter integration of the models three levels of
PRA, better treatment of “feedback loops”
• Improved HRA, particularly use of causal modes
for understanding of human response during an
accident. Also a closer consideration of decision
making with limited or misleading information (for
instance for sever accident conditions), and more
detailed models of possible complexities in carrying
out tasks due to external factors. 
• Use of advanced computational methods and solution
algorithms (for example algorithms based on Binary
Decision Diagrams) for increased accuracy and shorter
processing time. This is important for applications
that “rare event approximation” for probabilities
could introduce significant errors, and cases where
what-if analyses are needed to explore changes in
risk profile by changing modeling assumption and
postulating different conditions in the risk scenarios
and their constituent events. 
• Incorporation of lessons leaned and insights from
previous events and accidents into PRA models and
modeling process. This was one of the original
objectives of precursor studies, which was never
pursued in a systematic and consistent manner.
• Explicit inclusion of important "decision points" in
risk scenario models (particularly at the event tree
of event sequence diagrams levels). During major
accidents “closed” systems quickly become open
systems. Causes and consequences often go beyond
the physical and organizational boundaries of the
system. Command and control and decision-making
can change, sometime chaotically. Current PRAs tend
to limit modeling of decisions and interventions to
those made by system operators. However, response
to a system accident may involve other actors such
as managers of the organization, or other decision
makers outside the system (for example regulatory
bodies, emergency response organizations, and
public officials). Such decisions can significantly
alter the sequence of events and could become
major contributors to the risk. 
• Better use of the computer power now available in
extracting qualitative information from PRA models.
There is a wealth of information in the millions or
even billions of scenarios that can be created using
PRA models, and computers today are able to sort,
search, characterize, and categorize them to highlight
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hidden complexities and vulnerabilities that can be
masked by probabilistic ranking and screening of
scenarios.
6. BEYOND CURRENT FRAMEWORK 
Some of the main limitations of the classical PRA
framework are: 
• Risk scenarios and system vulnerabilities are essen-
tially developed by the analyst, meaning that the
PRA methodology itself does not “discover” the
scenarios, rather it is to a large extent a way of
documenting and organizing the analyst’s discoveries 
• Identifying risk scenarios in case of highly complex,
dynamic, hybrid systems of hardware, software, and
human components is very difficult, if not impossible,
with the static, largely hardware-oriented classical
framework
• Binary logic and deterministic cause-effect constructs
that are at the core of fault tree/event tree techniques
limit the spectrum of real world risk causal factors
of that could be included in risk scenarios 
To address these limitations new modeling approaches
and computational algorithms have been developed or
are being explored by researchers. The emerging methods
can be categorized and “evolutionary” (by extending
current PRA framework but not the fundamental style
and modeling paradigm), and “revolutionary” (by totally
changing the way risk models are developed, integrated,
and analyzed). In the following we briefly describe promi-
nent techniques under these categories, more specifically
the hybrid causal logic (HCL) methodology and simulation-
based or dynamic PRA methods
6.1 Hybrid Methods
Hybrid methods refer to integration of different
modeling techniques for developing risk scenarios and
contributing causes. With this definition classical PRA
framework is also a hybrid method, mixing deductive
and inductive logic models (event trees and fault trees).
But both the event tree and fault tree techniques are
essentially binary logic models representing deterministic
logic links among constituent elements (basic events).
The emerging hybrid methods tend to mix fundamentally
different representational and computational techniques.
Examples include:
• Logic-based simulation (DFM) [9]
• Linked Non-binary Event Sequence Diagram and
Fault Trees 
• Linked Fault Tree and Markov Models (to localized
systems dynamics) [8]
• Hybrid Causal Logic (HCL) Method [10]
The HCL methodology extends the deterministic
causal logic (ETs and FTs) of traditional PRA models to
include ‘‘soft’’ factors, such as the organizational and
regulatory environment of the physical system. The
integrated hybrid causal modeling framework is composed
of three layers: ESDs form the top layer, FTs form the
second layer, while Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) form
the bottom layer. An ESD is used to model temporal
sequences of events at a relatively high level of abstraction.
In the second layer, fault trees are used to model the factors
contributing to the properties and behaviors of the physical
system (e.g., hardware, software, environmental factors).
In the third layer BBNs extend the causal chain of events
to potential human, organizational, and socio-technical
roots where the causal relationships are often of uncertain
and non-deterministic nature. Since the impact of human
and organizational factors are usually shared by similar
and dissimilar components, their inclusion via BBN linked
to multiple system FTs properly accounts for dependencies
emerging form the common causal factors in a natural
and explicit way. The HCL solution algorithm, a hybrid
of the BBN solution algorithm and Binary Decision Diagram
(BDD) algorithm is capable of finding “cutsets” of the
hybrid model HCL (“most likely contributing states”),
calculated Importance Measures, and propagate uncertainties
in probabilities of the hybrid model elements and links.
A comprehensive HCL-based PRA platform (IRIS) has
been developed and used in several important applications,
most notably for civil aviation safety oversight and risk
management. [10]
6.2 Simulation Based Methods 
Simulation Based PRA methodologies (also known
as Dynamic PRA, DPRA) are essentially model-based
simulation approaches for generating risk scenarios. To
do so, rules of stochastic and deterministic behaviours of
the system and its elements (hardware, software, human
operators, process variables, and environmental conditions)
are developed as building blocks of a computer simulation
platform. The simulation platform tracks possible changes
in the states and values of the elements of the system as a
function of time. By accounts for the nature and impact
of the interactions and interdependencies among the system
elements, risk scenarios are generated by a simulation
engine. Depending on the particular method chosen for
scenario generation, probabilities of individual or clusters
of scenarios are calculated for the system “end states” of
interest. Dynamic methodologies are particularly powerful
when the system includes control loops, and/or complex
hardware/process/ software/human interactions. They
provide a natural environment to include physical models,
such as thermal hydraulic codes for NPPs, and physics of
failure models for hardware failure, as well as the impact
of natural hazards events. 
Dynamic PRA methodologies fall into two main
categories: continuous-time methods, and discrete-time
methods. Many of the research tools in the DPRA domain
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have adopted the latter. In this style of simulation, scenarios
are generated by branching to new sequences based on
changes in the states of the system elements and variables,
at user-specified time intervals. For each scenario, a time
dependent probability is calculated based constituent branch
probabilities [11].
Dynamic simulation-based approaches offer several
key advantages over the traditional “static” FT-ET based
PRA method. For example, dynamic simulation approaches
can more realistically represent event sequence timing,
provide a better representation of thermal hydraulic success
criteria, and permit more detailed and realistic modeling
of operator response.
Furthermore in DPRAs much of the complexity of
enumerating scenarios is delegated to scenario generating
algorithms, with reduced analyst-to-analyst variability of
the results as an added benefit. DPRA allows heterogeneous
models of various phenomena to be devolved and used at
different levels of detail. Simulation tracking can provide
desired information on nature of scenarios (“white box”
simulation). To cope with the possible “scenario space”
exploration, smart algorithms have been explored for
produce dominant risk scenarios at reasonable simulation
time. These include advanced Quantitative Biasing (biased
sampling), and Qualitative Biasing or “simulation planning”.
Examples of DPRA platforms are ADS [12] and ADAPT
[11]
Dynamic PRA however has its own challenges as
outlined by [13] 
• Development of physical models can be resource
intensive and validation/accreditation of models can
be difficult, particularly for rare events
• Obtaining a complete risk profile, i.e., ensuring that
a complete solution space is examined and repre-
sentative samples are chosen still requires further
research
• Methods are needed for aggregating, interpreting, and
communicating results. Simulation-based approaches
can produce expansive amounts of data and as such
identifying and focusing on key accident scenarios
can be difficult
• Efficient method are lacking for uncertainty analysis
as certain types of uncertainty and variability can
actually alter the structure of risk scenarios as they
evolved over the time. 
Despite these challenges Coyne et al [13] see some
near term benefits for regulatory applications including:
• Event and condition assessment (for cases involving
complex dependencies and success criteria, degraded
equipment, and variability in human response) 
• Support in expert elicitation/expert judgment based
decision-making. Simulation Based PRA can provide
useful insights and benchmarks for expert judgment
process (plant response, accident phenomenology),
and help establish a narrative of accident scenarios
• Insights to support traditional PRA modeling. DPRA
is a natural platform to combine probabilistic and
deterministic modeling approaches, in developing
success criteria, identifying causes, forms, and
consequences of human actions, and in structuring
event trees. It can also help foster better understanding
of the consequences of uncertain assumptions in
conventional PRAs.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have discussed some the strength and limitations
of the conventional PRA methodologies as used in some
technological sectors primarily nuclear power industry,
space, and aviation. A number of methodological improve-
ments that can significantly enhance the quality and
credibility of PRAs have also been listed. While current
methods will remain adequate for certain problems, the
next generation of PRA methods and tools are likely to
be hybrid methods and simulation based approaches. 
Main drivers of this evolutionally path are
• Expanding domain of applications of risk-informed
methods including risk-informed design and risk-
informed emergency response. Such extensions
require higher resolution of risk models, covering
wider spectrum of causal factors, and more advanced
inference and estimation methods
• Inadequacy of classical framework for modeling
highly context-dependent events such as human errors,
software failures, and dynamics of phenomenological
events
• Need for improving stakeholder confidence in risk-
informed decisions through improving and demon-
strating credibility of PRAs. This is particularly
challenging since in many direct Experimental
validation not possible in most cases, and the fact that
various benchmark studies on PRA method have
revealed significant differences in results when the
same risk problem is analyzed by different methods
and/or different analysts
Some of the enablers of the trend towards improved
PRA methods and introduction of new approaches are: 
• Advances in modeling of socio-technical systems 
• Advances in logic model solution algorithms and
probabilistic inference methods
• Exponential increase in computational power, new data
mining and visualization methods, and advancements
in information sharing technology that can be sued
for large scale collaborative modeling and analysis
• Rapid increase in use of “modeling and simulation”
in engineering of complex systems, and opportunity
that related tools and techniques can be used for full
scale simulation-based risk analysis.
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